What is the Federal Employer Liability Act (FELA)

In the years between 1889 and 1920, railroad use in this country expanded sixfold. With this expansion, the dangers to the railroad worker increased. See, H. Barber, The Transportation Industries 1889-1949, A Study of Output, Employment and Productivity (1951). President Harrison addressed these dangers in a speech to Congress in 1889 in which he compared the plight of the railroad worker to a soldier at war when he stated: "It is a reproach to our civilization that any class of American workmen, should in the pursuit of a necessary and useful vocation, be subjected to a peril of life and limb as great as that of a soldier in time of war." See, Johnson v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co ., 196 U.S. 1, 19 (1904). In discussing the need for legislation to address the railroad worker's exposure to harm, Congressman Flood, a strong advocate for the passage of the FELA, referred to alarming statistics about the injuries and deaths associated with work on the railroad. 40 Cong. Rec. (1906)
To curb these dangers, Congress relied upon the experience of certain states which had already passed legislation similar to the FELA to support the proposition that the FELA would lead to increased safety on the railroad. Congressman Flood, in urging the House of Representatives to "follow the lead of those enlightened and progressive states" 40 Cong.Rec. 4607 (1906) (Rep. Flood-Virginia) stated, "There can be no doubt that the enactment of the [state] laws was wise and has been conducive to greater care on the part of the railroads, and has not only saved the lives and limbs of worthy and deserving employees but of passengers as well." Id . Another Congressman echoed this sentiment in addressing a FELA proposal to alter the fellow servant rule when he said, "The best inducement to look after their employees and see that they have careful men employed, sober men employed, employed not more than ten hours at a time without sleep - the best way to enforce this is requiring them [the railroads] to pay damages when an engineer on duty for twenty hours falls asleep and an injury occurs." 40 Cong. Rec. 4606 (1906) ( Rep. Mann-Illinois).
After the passage of the FELA, the United States Supreme Court recognized the Congressional intent to promote safety through the FELA when it opined: "The Act ... is intended to stimulate carriers to greater diligence for the safety of their employees and of the persons and property of their patrons." Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640 (1930). Clearly, Congress passed the FELA to force the railroads to impose safe working conditions not just for the protection of the workers but also for the protection of the public at large.
In addition, the early legislative history reflects other Congressional motivations which were in effect when the FELA was initiated and passed. Congress made the determination that railroad work was inherently dangerous, and, having reached this decision, determined that it should spread the inevitable costs associated with the injuries and deaths which result from this danger to the railroad industry, because it was in the best position to bear the cost and to reduce these costs over time by the implementation of safer work practices.
The Senate Committee which initially reported the FELA out of committee concluded that the law was designed to achieve the broad purpose of promoting "the welfare of both employers and employee, by adjusting the losses and injuries inseparable from the industry, and commerce to the strength of those who in the nature of the case ought to share the burden." Senate Report No. 460, 6th Congress 1st Session 3. The members of the House of Representatives agreed with this view as indicated by the debate at 45 Cong. Rec. 4034 (1910), where it was reported that, "It is the intention of Congress in the enactment of this law originally and it may be presumed to be the intention of the present Congress, to shift the burden of the loss resulting from these casualties from 'those least able to bear it' and place it upon those who can, as the Supreme Court said in the Taylor case (210 US 281), 'measurably control their causes.'"
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged this legislative purpose. In Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 60, 68 (1948), in a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas noted: "[T]he F.E.L.A. was designed to put on the railroad industry some of the cost for the legs, eyes, arms, and lives which it consumed in its operations." In a later opinion, the Court stated that the "inescapable expense of railroading, must be borne by someone, and the F.E.L.A. seeks to adjust that expense equitably between the worker and the carrier." Kernan v. American Dredginq Co. , 355 U.S. 426, 431.
Congress also specifically designed the FELA to represent a departure from common law tort principles which Congress felt were inadequate to achieve its remedial and regulatory aims respecting the railroad industry. One congressman stated that the FELA was intended "to give relief against the rigors of the common-law." 40 Cong. Rec. 4608 (1906) (Rep. Flood). Another congressman explained: "The passage of the original Act and the perfection thereof by the amendments herein proposed stand forth as a declaration of public policy to radically change, as far as congressional power can extend, those rules of the common law..." 45 Cong. Rec. 4034 (1910). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court fully appreciated the intent of Congress and warned the lower courts not to rely on common law principles when applying the FELA because of the manifest congressional intent to the contrary. The Court explained that lower court reliance on common law principles to interpret the FELA represented a form of "judicial hostility" which has "hobbled the full play of the basic congressional intention." Rogers v. Missouri Pacific RR Co. , 352 U.S. 500, 509(1957).
Therefore, the congressional implementation of a causation standard which only requires that injuries be caused in whole or in part by the negligence of the railroad, as opposed to proximate causation, must be viewed as an expression of congressional intent to depart from the common law. Likewise, the FELA's reliance on comparative negligence, as opposed to the principles of contributory negligence, which were much more popular at the time of the act's passage, further exhibits this specific intent to forsake common law principles. As the Court stated in Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific R. Co. , 356 U.S. 326, 329(1957): "[I]n interpreting the F.E.L.A., we need not depend upon common-law principles of liability. This statute, an avowed departure from the rules of common-law, was a response to the special needs of railroad workers who are daily exposed to the risks inherent in railroad work and are helpless to provide for their own safety."
In the forty-four years following the enactment of the FELA, twenty-six bills were introduced to replace the FELA with workers' compensation. Congress refused in each instance to make this change, demonstrating its conviction that its regulatory and compensatory purposes can best be achieved through the FELA. These attacks upon the FELA have continued to the present, and in each instance they have been rebuffed by a Congress acutely aware of the need in the railroad industry for a law with the bite necessary to drive home the cause of safety for the public and for railroad workers exposed to the peculiar hazards of this industry on a daily